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CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY v. MARTINEZ: 
ROCK, PAPER, SCISSORS 
 
EDWARD J. SCHOEN 





In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,1 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the “all-comers” policy of the Hastings College of Law, a professional school 
within the University of California higher education system, under which all 
registered student organizations must allow any student to join, participate 
and seek leadership position regardless of the student’s religious beliefs and 
sexual orientation.2 Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy was challenged under 
the First Amendment by the Christian Legal Society, a student organization 
whose bylaws required all members to affirm their beliefs in enumerated 
principles, including the precept that sexual activity should not occur outside 
of marriage between a man and a woman, and refused membership to those 
students whose religious beliefs differed from the Christian Legal Society’s 
Statement of Faith or who engaged in “unrepentant homosexual conduct.”3  
Hastings denied official recognition of the Christian Legal Society as a 
student organization, because its restrictive membership policy violated 
Hastings’ all-comers membership requirements.4 
In reaching its decision, the Court addressed several fundamental First 
Amendment issues that collided forcefully in the parties’ dispute, namely 
whether Hastings’ all-comers policy improperly imposed speech limitations 
in a limited public forum, restricted the students’ freedom of association, and 
denied organizational recognition because of the religious beliefs espoused 
by the organization.  Because of the importance of these issues and the deep 
division of the Court in resolving them, careful analysis of the decision 
                                                 
 J.D., Professor of Management, Rohrer College of Business, Rowan University, Glassboro, 
New Jersey. 
 J.D., Professor of Business Administration, Chairperson of Business Administration and 
Management Department, McGowan School of Business, King’s College, Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania. 
1 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
2 Id. at 2995. 
3 Id. at 2980. 
4 Id. at 2979. 
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illuminates the direction the law may take in resolving future First 
Amendment litigation. 
 
II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SCENARIO 
 
Like many higher education institutions, Hastings encourages students 
to form extracurricular associations to enhance their academic and social 
interests outside the classroom and develop leadership skills.5  Hastings’ 
official recognition of student organizations confers significant benefits on 
those organizations, including financial assistance funded by mandatory 
student activity fees, access to the weekly newsletter, bulletin boards, and e-
mail systems to publicize club activities and recruit new members, as well as 
the use of Hastings’ name, logo, meeting facilities, and office space.6  
Hastings denies official recognition of student organizations, however, if 
they fail to comply with its nondiscrimination policy, which requires that all 
students must have the opportunity to join and seek leadership positions in 
recognized student organizations regardless of the students’ status or beliefs,7 
but permits recognized student organizations to enforce neutral membership 
requirements such as payment of dues, attendance at meetings, and, in the 
case of its law journals, strong writing skills.8 
The Christian Legal Society adopted bylaws requiring all members and 
officers to affirm a “Statement of Faith” confirming their belief in Jesus 
Christ as savior, the Trinity, and the Bible as the inspired word of God, and 
to conform their conduct to certain prescribed principles, such as the belief 
that sexual activity should only be undertaken by a man and a women joined 
in marriage.9  Because the adopted bylaws conflicted with the all-comers 
policy, the Christian Legal Society sought an exemption from Hastings’ 
nondiscrimination policy.10  Hastings denied the Christian Legal Society’s 
exemption application, because its bylaws barred student membership on the 
basis of their religious beliefs and sexual orientation.11  The Christian Legal 
Society filed suit against Hastings, claiming Hastings’ refusal to grant 
official recognition violated its First Amendment rights to free speech, 
expressive association, and free exercise of religion.12 
The Federal District Court granted Hastings’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment, ruling that Hastings’ denial of access to a limited public forum 
                                                 
5 Id. at 2978-79. 
6 Id. at 2979. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 2980. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 2980-81. 
12 Id. at 2981. 
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was viewpoint neutral, that the denial of official recognition did not impair 
the Christian Legal Society’s ability to meet and conduct group activities, 
and that Hastings’ all-comer policy did not deny the right to expressive 
association.13  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the all-comers policy 
was viewpoint neutral and reasonable.14  The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit. 
 
III. IMPORTANCE OF PARTIES’ STIPULATION OF FACTS 
 
Hastings and the Christian Legal Society entered into a stipulation of 
facts submitted jointly with their motions for summary judgment which 
provided: “Hastings requires that registered student organizations allow any 
student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the 
organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs.”15 
The Christian Legal Society attempted to argue before the U.S. 
Supreme Court that Hastings enforced the all-comers policy inconsistently, 
requiring only student associations organized on the basis of religious 
beliefs or sexual orientation to comply with the policy and leaving other 
student associations free to admit members on the basis of their ideology.16  
The majority opinion rejected this argument, noting that the parties agreed 
unqualifiedly that the all-comers policy presently governs student 
associations and that, having entered into the stipulation, the parties are not 
permitted to deny the truth of the stipulated fact or suggest on appeal that 
the facts are other than those stipulated or that material facts are omitted.17  
Rather, “a judicial admission . . . is conclusive in the case.”18  That being 
so, the majority opinion “consider[ed] only whether conditioning access to 
a student-organization forum on compliance with an all-comers policy 
violates the Constitution.”19 
The majority opinion’s insistence on adhering strictly to the parties’ 
stipulation was critical to the resolution of the case, because it permitted the 
                                                 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 2982. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 2983. 
18 Id. The majority opinion castigates the dissenters for attempting to “undermine the 
stipulation” and trying to cast doubt on “Hastings’ fidelity to its all-comers policy” by taking a 
sentence in Hastings’ answer to the Christian Legal Society’s first amended complaint out of 
context.  In context, the majority opinion insists, the sentence confirms that Hastings applies 
the all-comers policy to all groups.  In any event, the majority opinion concludes, the parties’ 
stipulation supersedes the answer and extinguishes any conflict between them.  Id. 
19 Id. at 2984.  The majority opinion criticizes the dissenters for suggesting the majority 
opinion makes findings of fact about the all-comers policy and for devoting “considerable 
attention to CLS’s arguments about the Nondiscrimination Policy as written.”  Id. 
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majority to focus on the limited public forum implications of Hastings’ all-
comers policy and to avoid consideration of whether the all-comers policy 
was selectively applied to religious groups, in which case the court would 
have to consider violations of freedom of association.  As noted below in part 
IV, the former issue requires the court to investigate the reasonableness of 
the policy and the latter issue requires the court apply strict scrutiny.  As 
discussed more fully in part VII below, if the latter test were applied, 
Christian Legal Society would likely have been decided very differently.20 
 
IV. FUNDAMENTAL FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES IN PLAY 
 
Fundamental First Amendment principles collide in the appeal of the 
Christian Legal Society: the constitutionality of restrictions on access to 
government property; the constitutionality of imposing restrictions on 
freedom of association; and the constitutionality of restrictions on student 
organizations based on the members’ religious beliefs. 
 
A. Government Restrictions on Public Forums 
 
The first principle at issue in Christian Legal Society concerns the right 
of a governmental unit to restrict the use of its own property.  In resolving 
this issue, courts employ four classifications of government property: 
traditional public forums, government designated public forums, limited 
public forums, and nonpublic forums.  Traditional public forums, such as 
streets and parks, “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.”21  The government may impose reasonable time, place and 
manner restrictions in traditional public forums, but any restriction based on 
                                                 
20 Brett G. Scharffs, May a Public Law School Deny Recognition to a Religious Student Group 
Based on the School’s Nondiscrimination Policy? 37 A.B.A. PREVIEW 296, 304 (2010) (“The 
key to the case probably lies in the facts the Court embraces as the basis for its analysis.  If the 
Court follows the lead of CLS and focuses on Hastings’ application of its nondiscrimination 
policy in a way that seems targeted exclusively at a religious group, it seems likely that the 
policy will be found to violate the First Amendment’s protections of free speech or 
association.  If, on the other hand, the Court accepts at face value the stipulated facts, that 
Hastings applies the all-comers policy equally to all student groups, then it seems likely that 
the Court will give the University sufficient latitude to adopt such a policy, even in the face of 
the possibility of groups being sabotaged or hijacked by unsympathetic student participants.”). 
21 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1983); Hague v. 
CIO, 59 S. Ct. 954, 964 (1939). 
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the content of the speech must satisfy strict scrutiny; that is, the restriction 
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.22 
Governments create designated public forums when “government 
property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is 
intentionally opened up for that purpose.”23  Thus, for example, a state 
university creates a designated public forum when it adopts a policy of 
permitting registered student groups to use its facilities for meetings,24 a state 
creates a designated public forum by passing a statute requiring open school 
board meetings,25 and a city creates a designated public forum when it 
designs and dedicates a municipal auditorium for expressive activities.26  
Speakers cannot be excluded from designated public forums without a 
compelling interest, and restrictions are subject to the same strict scrutiny 
applicable to traditional public forums.27 
Governments create limited public forums when they permit their 
property, which is neither a traditional nor a designated public forum, to be 
used for communication purposes but restrict use of the property to 
designated groups or certain topics.28  The public does not have access to 
government property simply because it is owned or controlled by the 
government, and the government may, as the owner of the property, impose 
time, place and manner regulations, and reserve the property for a limited 
and dedicated use.29  Thus, for example, a school district creates a limited 
public forum when it allows the union representing the teachers access to the 
interschool mail system.30  The school district may also permit identified 
groups, such as the YMCA, Cub Scouts, and civic and church organizations 
                                                 
22 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448 (1985); Carey v. 
Brown, 100 S. Ct. 2286, 2291 (1980).  The U.S. Supreme Court most recently considered a 
restriction on speech in a traditional public forum in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. 
Ct. 1125 (2009), in which the Court was asked to decide whether the refusal of the city to 
permit a religious organization to display a monument containing a statement of its religious 
principles in Pioneer Park violated the First Amendment.  The Court acknowledged that 
Pioneer Park was a traditional public forum and any restriction on the use of that forum must 
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.  Id. at 1132.  The Court 
decided, however, that the right of Pleasant Grove City to engage in government speech by 
deciding what monuments to place in Pioneer Park trumped public forum analysis, because 
requiring the City to display all donated monuments would lead inexorably to the destruction 
or closing of the forum.  Id. at 1138. 
23 Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3449. 
24 Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981). 
25 Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 97 S. Ct. 421, 426, n. 5 
(1976). 
26 Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 95 S. Ct. 1239 (1975). 
27 Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3448; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 103 S. Ct. at 955. 
28 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 103 S. Ct. at 955. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 956. 
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to use the mail system, but deny access to a rival union, without danger of 
converting the mail system into a designated public forum.31  Because the 
school mail system is not a public forum, the school district is not required to 
permit any organization to use the school mail boxes.32  As long the decision 
of the school district to limit access is reasonable, the restriction does not 
violate the First Amendment.33 
Governments create nonpublic forums when they restrict the use of their 
property to a limited purpose which would be disrupted if broader access 
were permitted or when the excluded use of the forum is inconsistent with 
the purpose for which the property is normally is utilized.  For example, the 
decision of a city to permit “purveyors of goods and services” to place 
advertisements on its city transit vehicles, but to refuse access to politicians 
seeking advertising space does not violate the First Amendment, because no 
public forum was created. 34  Rather, the city sought to “minimize chances of 
abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive 
audience,” and these objectives were reasonable.35  Similarly, governments 
can provide restricted access to military reservations and jailhouse grounds 
without being forced to permit wider public access, because the use of the 
property would be disrupted by broader public use.36  Likewise, the federal 
government may restrict the charitable organizations listed on the Combined 
Federal Campaign Contributor’s Leaflet used as part of the annual charity 
drive aimed at federal employees to “nonprofit charitable agencies that 
provide direct health and welfare services to individuals or their families.”37  
Without such a limitation, the federal government would potentially have 
been forced to permit 850,000 charitable organizations to participate by 
printing their thirty-word descriptions on the leaflet.38  Because unlimited 
participation would disrupt the workplace and destroy the effectiveness of 
the charitable campaign, the federal government can exercise control over 
access.39  Hence the Combined Federal Campaign was deemed to be a 
nonpublic forum,40 and the federal government is permitted to control access 
on the basis of “subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions 




34 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 94 S. Ct. 2714, 2717 (1974). 
35 Id. at 2718. 
36 Greer v. Spock, 96 S. Ct. 1211, 1217 (1976) (“[T]he business of a military installation [is] to 
train soldiers, not provide a public forum.”); Adderley v. Florida, 87 S. Ct. 242, 247 (1996) 
(noting that protestors have no right of expression “on that part of jail grounds reserved for jail 
uses”). 
37 Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3342-43.  
38 Id. at 3451. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served and are viewpoint 
neutral.”41 
 
B. Restrictions on Freedom of Association 
 
Governmental restraints on freedom of association and freedom not to 
associate are subject to close scrutiny and may not be upheld unless “they 
serve ‘compelling state interests’ that are ‘unrelated to the suppression of 
ideas’ – interests that cannot be advanced ‘through . . . significantly less 
restrictive means.’”42  In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,43 the U.S. 
Supreme Court confronted conflicting admission standards to the Jaycees, an 
organization founded in 1920 as the Junior Chamber of Commerce.44  Local 
Jaycee chapters in Minneapolis and St. Paul admitted women as regular 
members, contrary to the national Jaycee bylaws which restricted 
membership to men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five.45  The 
national organization advised both chapters that that their charters would be 
revoked, and the two chapters, alleging the exclusion of women from full 
membership was a violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex, filed charges with the 
Minnesota Department of Human Rights.46  The Minnesota Department of 
Human Rights determined that the revocation of Jaycee charters of the 
Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act, 
and the national organization brought suit against state officials in the federal 
district court, contending that requiring the organization to admit women 
violated the male members’ rights of free speech and association.47  The 
federal district court certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court the question 
whether the Jaycees was a “place of public accommodation within the 
meaning of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.”48  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court decided the Jaycees organization was a place of public 
accommodation, because it sells goods and extends privileges in exchange 
for membership dues, and the Jaycees amended its complaint to ask the 
federal district court to consider the constitutionality of that determination.49  
                                                 
41 Id. at 3451-52. 
42 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3252 (1984); Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 
130 S. Ct. 2971, 2784 (2010) (holding that freedom of association includes the right not to 
associate); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct. 1782, 1799 (1977). 
43 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984). 
44 Id. at 3247. 
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The federal district court ruled in favor of the state officials, and the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the Jaycees engaged in 
advocacy of political causes and mandating the membership of women 
“would produce a ‘direct and substantial’ interference with that freedom,” 
because the change in membership would “necessarily result in ‘some 
change in the Jaycees’ philosophical cast.’”50  Minnesota’s interest in 
eliminating discrimination, the court concluded, was insufficiently 
compelling to outweigh the Jaycees’ constitutional right of association.51 
The U.S. Supreme Court closely considered the admission requirements 
utilized by the Jaycees, and determined the membership in local Minnesota 
chapters was neither small (the Minnesota chapter had about 430 members 
and St. Paul about 400 members) nor selective.  New members were 
admitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds and the national organization 
imposed no requirements other than age and sex.52  This caused the Court to 
conclude the Jaycees was essentially an organization of strangers, rather than 
an organization selecting members on the basis of personal or intimate 
affinity or affiliation, to which constitutionally protected freedom of 
association applied.53  While the members of Jaycees do have associative 
rights to pursue political, economic and ideological interests, that right does 
not, the Court concluded, overcome “Minnesota’s compelling interest in 
eradicating discrimination against its female citizens.”54  Further, Minnesota 
advanced this interest “through the least restrictive means of achieving its 
ends,”55 and the Jaycees failed to demonstrate how Minnesota’s anti-
discrimination policy imposed “any serious burdens on the male members’ 
freedom of expressive association,” or how the admission of women as full 
voting members impedes participation in such activities.56  Consequently, the 
Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and upheld the right of 
the Minnesota Jaycee chapters to admit women as full voting members.57 
                                                 
50 Id. at 3249. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 3251. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 3253. 
55 Id. at 3254. 
56 Id. at 3255. 
57 The same result was reached in Board of Directors of Rotary International. v. Rotary Club 
of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the admission 
of women to membership in the Rotary Club pursuant to California’s equal accommodations 
law did not violate the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of association, in the absence 
of evidence the admission of women would restrict the accomplishment of organizational 
objectives or interfere with the organization’s classification and admission systems, because 
“the relationship among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate or private relation 
that warrants constitutional protection. “  Id. at 1946. 
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In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,58 the U.S. Supreme Court considered 
the constitutionality of the expulsion of James Dale from the Boy Scouts 
because he was homosexual.  Active in scouting from ages eight to eighteen, 
Dale applied for adult membership as an Assistant Scout Master of Troup 73.  
His membership was approved around the time he left home to attend 
Rutgers University. At Rutgers, he became active in the Lesbian/Gay 
Alliance, advocated increasing gay role models for homosexual teenagers, 
and was identified in a newspaper article as the co-president of the 
Lesbian/Gay Alliance.59  The Monmouth Boy Scout Council revoked his 
adult membership, because Boy Scouts policy denied membership to 
homosexuals.60  Dale filed a complaint against the Boy Scouts in the New 
Jersey Superior Court, alleging his expulsion violated New Jersey’s public 
accommodations law, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.61  The New Jersey Superior Court ruled that the Boy Scouts was 
not a place of public accommodation, but rather was a “distinctly private 
group exempted from coverage under New Jersey’s law, and that the Boy 
Scouts’ policy of not admitting homosexuals was protected by the First 
Amendment freedom of expressive association.”62  The New Jersey Superior 
Court’s Appellate Division reversed, holding that the public accommodations 
law applied to the Boy Scouts and was violated by the expulsion of Dale.63  
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, deciding that the Boy Scouts was a 
public accommodation and that, because the membership of the Boy Scouts 
was large and nonselective and inclusive rather than exclusive, and because 
the organization’s practice was to invite or allow nonmembers to attend 
meetings, the membership of the Boy Scouts was not sufficiently personal or 
private to warrant First Amendment protection under the freedom of intimate 
association.64 
The U.S. Supreme Court preliminarily laid the foundation of its freedom 
of association analysis by focusing on the Boy Scouts’ mission statement,65 
the Scout Oath,66 and the Scout Law,67 all of which, the Court emphasized, 
                                                 
58 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). 
59 Id. at 2449. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 2449-50. 
62 Id. at 2450. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 2451. 
65 “It is the mission of the Boy Scouts of America to serve others by helping to instill values in 
young people and, in other ways, to prepare them to make ethical choices over their lifetime in 
achieving their full potential.”  Id. 
66 “On my honor I will do my best to do my duty to God and country and obey the Scout Law; 
To help other people at all times; To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and 
morally straight.”  Id. at 2451-52. 
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underscored the core purpose of the Boy Scouts to instill a system of values 
and moral beliefs through engagement in expressive activity.68  Further, the 
Boy Scouts claimed, “it does not want to promote homosexual conduct as a 
legitimate form of behavior” and teaches homosexual behavior is not 
“morally straight,”69 and its position statement maintained: “The Boy Scouts 
of America is a private, membership organization and leadership therein is a 
privilege and not a right. We do not believe that homosexuality and 
leadership in Scouting are appropriate.”70 Admitting Dole to adult 
membership in the Boy Scouts as an assistant scoutmaster, the Court noted, 
“would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to 
the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual 
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”71 
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of 
Boston,72 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the South Boston Allied War 
Veterans Council (“the Veterans Council”), an unincorporated association of 
individuals elected from various South Boston veterans groups which 
annually organizes and conducts Boston’s St. Patrick’s-Evacuation Day 
Parade (“the Parade”), could not be compelled by the government to allow 
the Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (“GLIB”), a social 
organization of persons who are homosexual or bisexual and their supporters, 
to march in the parade.73  The Court initially determined that the Parade was 
expression for purposes of the First Amendment.  It was a festive event in 
which people in costumes and uniforms, marching bands and floats, and 
colorful flags and banners entertained the spectators lining the streets and the 
television viewers in their homes.74  While conceding the Veterans Council 
was rather lenient in admitting diverse groups with a wide range of messages 
to its parade, relaxed admissions requirements did not forfeit the parade 
organizers’ constitutional protections.75  Rather, the Court noted, the First 
Amendment protects the parade organizers’ rights to assemble a multifaceted 
message of their own choosing, much the same way as the First Amendment 
protects cable operators’ selection of programs to be rebroadcast and 
newspaper editors’ assembly of diverse voices on the editorial page.76 
                                                                                                                   
67 “A Scout is: Trustworthy, Obedient, Helpful, Thrifty, Friendly, Brave, Clean, Kind, 
Reverent.”  Id. at 2452. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 2453. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995). 
73 Id. at 2341, 2350. 
74 Id. at 2345. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 2345-46. 
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Because GLIB was formed for the very purpose of marching in and 
communicating its ideas as part of the Parade,77 the "state court’s application 
of [the public accommodations act] produced an order essentially requiring 
petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade.”78  Such compelled 
speech violates the fundamental autonomy given to the speakers under the 
First Amendment to choose the content of their own message.79  The Court 
continued: 
 
Indeed, this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the 
speech, applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or 
endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker would 
rather avoid, subject, perhaps, to the permissive law of defamation.  
Nor is the rule’s benefit restricted to the press, being enjoyed by 
business corporations generally and by ordinary people engaged in 
unsophisticated expression as well as by professional publishers.  
Its point is simply the point of all speech protection, which is to 
shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are 
misguided, or even hurtful (citations omitted).80 
 
Roberts, Dale and Hurley provide significant First Amendment 
protection of the freedom to associate and not to associate, namely that 
government restrictions on associational relationships must serve compelling 
interests that cannot be attained through less restrictive means.  That 
protection, however, is not provided unless the associational value of 
membership in the organization is clear and strong.  In Roberts, the 
associational value of membership in the Jaycees was deemed to be weak, 
because the Jaycees were not selective in their membership and did not 
demonstrate how admitting women would burden the members’ participation 
in expressive activities.  Hence, the need to eliminate discrimination against 
women prevailed over the Jaycees’ freedom of association.  In Dale, the Boy 
Scouts created a clear system of values and beliefs, promulgated those values 
and beliefs unambiguously in its organizational mission statement, scout 
oath, and scout law, and instilled those values and beliefs in its members.  
The Boy Scouts’ values and beliefs held that homosexual activity was 
morally wrong, and the admission of homosexual scout leaders directly 
contradicted what the organizations stood for.  Hence, because the 
associational value of the Boy Scouts was strong, it prevailed over the private 
organization’s discrimination against homosexuals.  In Hurley, the 
                                                 
77 Id. at 2347. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 2347-48. 
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expressive activity was the annual parade, and the parade organizers had a 
long history of deciding what organizations could and could not participate in 
the parade.  While the expression emanating from the parade was diverse and 
the admission standards were lenient, the associational value in terms of the 
participants’ expression was sufficiently strong to overcome the need to 
eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
 
C. University Restrictions on Student Organizations Based on Content of 
Expression 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has on at least three occasions dealt with 
university restrictions on student organizations based on the content of their 
expression.  In Healy v. James,81 students at Central Connecticut State 
University filed a request to establish a local chapter of the Students for a 
Democratic Society, and a Student Affairs Committee approved the 
application and recommended recognition of the chapter.82  The president of 
the University, however, rejected the recommendation, and issued a 
statement denying the chapter the benefits of official campus recognition, 
because he found the organization’s philosophy antithetical to the school’s 
policies and to academic freedom.83  The U.S. Supreme Court concluded the 
denial of campus recognition violated the First Amendment.84  While the 
Court recognized that universities can require campus organizations to affirm 
their willingness to adhere to campus policies governing student conduct, 
universities cannot suppress the organization’s speech or association simply 
because it finds the views expressed to be abhorrent.85 
In Widmar v. Vincent,86 a registered student religious group, 
Cornerstone, asked the University of Missouri at Kansas City to provide 
meeting space for its members.87  The policy of the University was to 
encourage the activities of student organizations and to provide facilities for 
their meetings, and, pursuant to that policy, the University permitted 
Cornerstone to meet on campus.  In 1977, however, the University Board of 
Curators changed the policy to prohibit the use of buildings and grounds for 
the purpose of religious worship or teaching.88  Student members of 
Cornerstone brought suit to challenge the regulation on the grounds it 
                                                 
81 Healy v. James, 92 S. Ct. 2338 (1972). 
82 Id. at 2342. 
83 Id. at 2343. 
84 Id. at 2352. 
85 Id. at 2349, 2352-53. 
86 Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981). 
87 Id. at 272. 
88 Id. 
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violated their right to free exercise of religion and freedom of speech.89  The 
U.S. Supreme Court determined that, having established a limited public 
forum for student expression, the University was required to demonstrate its 
regulation was necessary to serve a compelling state interest and was 
narrowly constructed to achieve that end.90 The Court rejected the 
University’s argument that it was obligated by the Establishment Clause91 not 
to provide its facilities to religious groups.92  Rather, the Court concluded, 
providing meeting space for Cornerstone neither confers approval of its 
religious principles or practices nor empowers the religious organization to 
dominate the limited public forum.93  Further, providing meeting space to 
religious groups does not interfere with the University’s capacity to establish 
reasonable time, place and manner regulations.94  Having created a limited 
public forum to student organizations, the University is not permitted to 
impose content-based exclusions on speech, religious or otherwise.95 
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia 96 the 
University of Virginia withheld payment to an outside contractor for printing 
a student newspaper produced by Wide Awake Productions, a recognized 
student organization which promoted Christian values and viewpoints.97  The 
University normally paid outside contractors for expenses related to student 
news, information, and opinion, but excluded student religious organizations 
from its disbursement request program.98  When Wide Awake Publications 
submitted a disbursement request for the cost of printing its newspaper,99 the 
University denied the request because of the religious perspective of the 
newspaper.100  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the University of 
Virginia's refusal to pay the publication costs of the Wide Awake 
Productions’ newspaper constituted government-imposed viewpoint 
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.101  Having established a 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 274. 
91 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. amend I.  
The Establishment Clause has been made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 60 S. Ct. 900, 903 (1940). 
92 Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 276 (1981). 
93 Id. at 276-77. 
94 Id. at 277. 
95 Id. at 279. 
96 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). 
97 Id. at 2515, 2525. 
98 Id. at 2514.  A “religious activity” was defined as any activity that “primarily promotes or 
manifests a particular belief about a deity.”  Id. at 2515. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 2516, 2520. 
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limited public forum for the expression of various student viewpoints,102 the 
University was prohibited by the First Amendment from excluding Wide 
Awake Publications because it advocated a Christian perspective.103  The 
Court further determined the use of student fees to pay publication costs for a 
student newspaper promoting a Christian perspective does not violate the 
Establishment Clause, because the university's student activities fee, unlike 
taxes levied for direct support of a church or group of churches, was "neutral 
toward religion."104 
In Healy, Widmar and Rosenberger, the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down the attempts by universities to restrict access of student organizations 
to limited public forums because of their viewpoints.  Having created and 
sanctioned the limited public forum, the university was required to “respect 
the lawful boundaries it has itself set,”105 and the First Amendment prohibits 
universities from excluding speech on the basis of the viewpoint expressed. 
 
V. MAJORITY OPINION IN CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY 
 
After dealing with the parties’ stipulation of facts and the Christian 
Legal Society’s attempt sidestep it, as discussed in part III above, the 
immediate issue confronting the U.S. Supreme Court was deciding what test 
to apply to resolve the First Amendment issues presented.  As noted above in 
part IV, government infringement on freedom of association is governed by 
the strict scrutiny test, while government restrictions on speech in limited 
public forums are governed by the reasonableness test.  The Christian Legal 
Society argued that Hastings’ imposition of the all-comers policy violated 
their rights of association and religious speech and that the two tests should 
be considered separately.106  The majority opinion107 deftly rejected this 
argument, and determined that Hastings’ efforts to promote student 
organizations established a limited public forum,108 and that limited public 
forum analysis adequately respects and fairly balances the Christian Legal 
Society’s religious speech and expressive-association rights.109  The Court 
                                                 
102 Id. at 2517. 
103 Id.  "The Guideline invoked by the University to deny third-party contractor payments on 
behalf of [Wide Awake Publications] effects a sweeping restriction on student thought and 
student inquiry in the context of University sponsored publications."  Id. at 2520. 
104 Id. at 2522. 
105 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2988 (2010). 
106 Id. at 2985. 
107 The majority opinion was authored by Justice Ginzberg.  Justices Stevens, Kennedy, 
Breyer and Sotomayor joined the majority opinion, and Justices Stevens and Kennedy filed 
concurring opinions. 
108 Id. at 2984. 
109 Id. at 2986. 
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explained that it “makes little sense” to consider Christian Legal Society’s 
religious speech and association arguments as two separate lines of 
argumentation, because “expressive-association and free speech arguments 
merge”110 and the “limited-public-forum precedents supply the appropriate 
framework for assessing [Christian Legal Society’s] speech and association 
rights.”111  Further, Hastings’ all-comers policy merely withheld benefits 
rather than required admission of all applicants for club membership -  as the 
Court noted, it simply dangles “the carrot of subsidy” rather than wields “the 
stick of prohibition” -  it is more fitting to apply the less-restrictive limited-
public forum analysis.112 
Having determined that the limited public forum analysis was 
applicable, the Court reiterated the appropriate test to be applied to the all-
comers policy: the university may not prohibit speech if its decision 
discriminates on the basis of the viewpoint expressed.113  Deferring to the 
significant discretion of colleges and universities to assemble its educational 
and extracurricular programs, the Court considered the justifications 
advanced by Hastings in support of its all-comers policy:114 open access 
maximizes the opportunities of student attainment of leadership positions in 
                                                 
110 Id. at 2985. 
111 Id.  The Court reasoned: (1) the speech and association interests of the Christian Legal 
Society were closely intertwined, and it would be “anomalous for a restriction on speech to 
survive constitutional review under our limited public forum test only to be invalidated by an 
impermissible infringement of expressive association”; (2) strict scrutiny analysis applicable 
to “expressive association would, in practical effect, invalidate a defining characteristic of 
limited public forums,” namely that the state is permitted to reserve them for certain groups; 
and (3) Hastings’ student organization program imposes only indirect pressure on the 
Christian Legal Society to change its membership requirements.  In other words, the Christian 
Legal Society could (and in fact did) choose to forego the benefits of recognized organization 
status in order to limit its membership rather than being directly compelled to accept members 
it objected to. 
112 Id. at 2986.  Two commentators strongly object to the Court’s characterization of denying 
access to campus facilities as “dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of 
prohibition.”  William E. Thro & Charles J. Russo, A Serious Setback for Freedom: The 
Implications of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 261 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 473, 486 
(2010) (“By equating access to a limited public forum as a form of subsidy, the Supreme 
Court accepted the premise that recognition and/or funding of student groups is a subsidy.  
However, since ‘the government generally need not subsidize the exercise of constitutional 
rights,’ universities may require student organizations to admit those who disagree as a 
condition of receiving benefits.  If anything, characterizing recognition as a subsidy 
‘undervalues the expressive interests at stake.’  Moreover, although there are significant 
distinctions between recognition of a student organization and financial payments to support 
that organization's activities, the Opinion of the Court does not distinguish between 
recognition and funding.  Indeed, the Court's student organization jurisprudence has never 
distinguished between recognition and funding.”). 
113 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2988 (2010). 
114 Id. at 2989.  
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student organizations,115 reduces the policing requirements in enforcing its 
nondiscrimination policy,116 and encourages cooperation and tolerance 
among students with diverse backgrounds.117  Those justifications, the Court 
concluded, support its all-comers requirement, and “are surely reasonable in 
light of the recognized student organization forum's purposes.”118  Further, 
the Court noted, the Christian Legal Society, although denied access to the 
law school’s electronic means of communications, was able to host a variety 
of activities and significantly increase student participation.119  Finally, the 
Court emphasized, “requiring all student groups to accept all comers”120 does 
not distinguish groups based on their message or perspective, and is 
“textbook viewpoint neutral.”121 
While it conceded Hastings’ all-comers policy was “nominally 
neutral,”122 the Christian Legal Society argued that the all-comers policy 
“systematically and predictably [burdened] most heavily those groups whose 
viewpoints are out of favor with the campus mainstream.”123  The majority 
opinion dismissed this argument, because “[a] regulation that serves purposes 
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an 
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”124  The Court 
noted:  
 
Even if a regulation has a differential impact on groups wishing to 
enforce exclusionary membership policies, “[w]here the [State] 
does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts 
are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a 
discriminatory idea or philosophy.125 
                                                 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 2990 (“If a hypothetical Male-Superiority Club barred a female student from running 
for its presidency, for example, how could the Law School tell whether the group rejected her 
bid because of her sex or because, by seeking to lead the club, she manifested a lack of belief 
in its fundamental philosophy?”). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 2991. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 2993. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 2994. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (municipal noise 
regulation designed to ensure that music performances in band shell did not disturb 
surrounding residents, by requiring performers to use sound system and sound technician 
provided by city, did not violate free speech rights of performers); Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (that injunction restricted speech of only antiabortion 
protestors did not make it content based). 
125 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2994 (2010) (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (ordinance prohibiting display of symbols likely to arouse anger or 
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Hence, in the majority opinion’s view, Hastings’ all-comers policy 
attempts to make sure members would not be rejected for membership in 
student organizations because of their religious beliefs or sexual orientation, 
and that objective constitutes an adequate explanation for its policy separate 
and apart from the Christian Legal Society’s assertion the all-comers policy 
represented disagreement with student organizations’ beliefs.126  That being 
so, the Court concluded, “Hastings’ open-access condition on [Recognized 
Student Organization] status [was] reasonable and viewpoint neutral,” and 
the “[Christian Legal Society’s] free-speech and expressive association 
claims” must be rejected.127 
Finally, the Court rebuffed the Christian Legal Society’s argument that 
Hastings’ all-comers policy violated the Free Exercise Clause, determining 
that “the Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise 
valid regulations of general application that incidentally burden religious 
conduct”128 and that the Christian Legal Society, in requesting an exemption 
from the all-comers policy sought “preferential, not equal, treatment,” 
precluding its free exercise argument.129 
 
VI. DISSENTING OPINION IN CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY 
 
The dissenting opinion130 rests on its contention that “strong evidence” 
exists showing Hastings applied its all-comers policy as a pretext to engage 
in viewpoint discrimination,131 and cites the following evidence for this 
                                                                                                                   
resentment in others on the basis of their race, color, creed, religion or gender, even though 
narrowly construed by the state supreme court to address “fighting words,” violates the First 
Amendment on its face, because it prohibits speech on the basis of the subjects addressed in 
the speech)). 
126 Christian Legal Society, 130 S. Ct. at 2994. 
127 Id. at 2995. 
128 Id.  See Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the Free Exercise Clause permits the State to 
prohibit sacramental peyote use and to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for 
such use.  Oregon law prohibited the possession of controlled substances, and two employees 
of a private drug rehabilitation organization were fired because they ingested peyote, a 
controlled substance.  The fired workers claimed they did so as a sacramental practice of the 
Native American Church in which they were members.  Their ensuing applications for 
unemployment benefits were denied, because they were fired for work-related misconduct.  
The U.S. Supreme Court decided the denial of unemployment benefits did not violate the Free 
Exercise clause, because individuals are obligated to comply with criminal laws that 
incidentally prohibit the performance of religious practices, as long as the law is not directed 
specifically to the religious practice. 
129 Christian Legal Society, 109 S. Ct. at 2995. 
130 The dissenting opinion was authored by Justice Alito.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia and Thomas joined in the dissenting opinion. 
131 Id. at 3001. 
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proposition: (1) Hastings recognizes more than sixty student organizations, 
but “in all its history” denied recognition to only one, the Christian Legal 
Society132; (2) Hastings admitted in its answer to Christian Legal Society’s 
first amended complaint that it “permits political, social, and cultural student 
organizations to select officers and members who are dedicated to a 
particular set of ideals or beliefs”133; (3) inconsistencies existed in documents 
and depositions as to when the all-comers policy was implemented134; (4) 
Hastings “routinely registered student groups with bylaws limiting 
membership and leadership positions to those who agreed with the groups' 
viewpoints,”135 but required the Christian Legal Society to comply with the 
all-comers policy136; (5) Hastings inconsistently described its all-comers 
policies in various legal briefs137; (6) substantial differences existed in 
Hastings’ nondiscrimination and all-comers policies138; and (7) Hastings 
cited its nondiscrimination policy (rather than its all-comers policy) as 
grounds for denying the application of Christian Legal Society for an 
exemption.139 
The dissenting opinion also disagrees with the conclusion of the 
majority opinion that the Christian Legal Society suffered no harm from its 
non-recognition. While Hastings offered to provide facilities for the Christian 
Legal Society meetings, its requests were given low priority and the 
administration routinely failed to respond to its requests for meeting space 
until after the date requested had passed, including the Christian Legal 
Society’s request to set up a table to recruit members on the campus patio at 
the beginning of the academic year.140  Further, denied access to funding 
through student fees and to the electronic means of communication provided 
by Hastings, membership in the Christian Leadership Society declined to 
seven members.141  The dissenting opinion also chides the majority opinion 
for emphasizing the Christian Legal Society’s ability to endure 
discrimination:  
 
This Court does not customarily brush aside a claim of unlawful 
discrimination with the observation that the effects of the 
discrimination were really not so bad.  We have never before taken 
                                                 
132 Id. at 3000. 
133 Id. at 3003. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 3004. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 3004-05. 
139 Id. at 3005. 
140 Id. at 3006. 
141 Id. 
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the view that a little viewpoint discrimination is acceptable.  Nor 
have we taken this approach in other discrimination cases.142 
 
Because Hastings arguably used its all-comers policy to discriminate 
against the Christian Legal Society viewpoints, the dissenting opinion relies 
on Healy for the proposition that refusal to recognize a student organization 
because of its viewpoint and to deny it access to campus facilities and 
customary means of communication among members of the college 
community burdens the student members’ right of association.143  Further, 
the minority opinion insists, the court in Healy rightfully refused to grant 
deference to the college president, because it is the responsibility of the court 
to exercise its own judgment on the interpretation and application of free 
speech.144  Moreover, granting the application of limited public forum cases 
to Hastings’ all-comers policy, the minority opinion maintains that Hastings 
violated the requirement of viewpoint neutrality, because its refusal to 
recognize the Christian Legal Society impermissibly discriminated on the 
basis of religion and sexual orientation.145 
If the dissenting opinion’s insistence that Hastings’ all-comers policy 
was used as a pretext for viewpoint discrimination had prevailed, Hastings’ 
decision not to recognize the Christian Legal Society would likely have been 
governed by the strict scrutiny test applicable to association infringement 
cases.  The Christian Legal Society employed stringent admission standards, 
required its members to affirm their belief in the group’s religious principles, 
and conducted activities aimed at inculcating those beliefs in its members.  
Given the high associational value of membership in the Christian Legal 
Society, forcing the Christian Legal Society to accept members who did not 
share its beliefs compelled it to contradict the values it stood for.  Were strict 
scrutiny applied to review Hastings’ actions, it is doubtful the law school’s 
purported interests for imposing the all-comers policy - exposing students to 
differing views, maximizing the availability of student leadership positions 
and encouraging cooperation and tolerance - would be deemed compelling in 
the eyes of the dissenting justices.  Further, following Healy, the dissenters 
certainly would not likely have given deference to the judgment of academic 
organizations regarding student activities and organizations.146  Hence, using 
strict scrutiny, Hastings’ imposition of the all-comers policy would likely 
                                                 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 3007. 
144 Id. at 3008. 
145 Id. at 3010. 
146 Id. at 3008 (“It is also telling that the Healy Court, unlike today's majority, refused to defer 
to the college president's judgment regarding the compatibility of “sound educational policy” 
and free speech rights.  The same deference arguments that the majority now accepts were 
made in defense of the college president's decision to deny recognition in Healy.”). 
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have been deemed to infringe on the Christian Legal Society members’ 
freedom of association, and Hastings would have been required to recognize 
the Christian Legal Society and grant an exemption to its admission 
criteria.147 
 
VII. SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY 
 
The majority opinion in Christian Legal Society is significant in three 
ways.  First, the decision to uphold the all-comers policy is confined to 
limited public forums of colleges and universities.  More particularly, the 
decision permits academic institutions to require that student activities and 
organizations to admit all students regardless of their viewpoints or sexual 
orientation and to deny access to state university property if the recognized 
student organization refuses to compromise on its admission standards.148  To 
pass First Amendment muster in this arena, the academic institutions’ 
requirements need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.  By avoiding 
the issue of freedom of association, the majority escaped a much wider and 
more difficult issue of whether or not “religious groups, as well as other 
types of expressive association, have the right to discriminate in the selection 
of their voting members and officers.”149  As noted by Professor Scharffs: 
 
The principles articulated in this context could have significant 
implications on so-called charitable choice programs, where 
religiously affiliated groups that provide social services are able to 
receive federal funding and are also allowed . . .  to discriminate on 
                                                 
147 “The choice of the ‘reasonable’ and viewpoint-neutral test -  that is, the choice of the 
appropriate doctrinal box or category on the First Amendment case law flowchart -  essentially 
dictated the result.  If a different box had been chosen, a different (and more stringent) test 
would have applied, and a different result might very well have been obtained.”  Vikram 
Amar, “The First Amendment in the 2009 Term: It’s All About How You Frame It”, 37 A.B.A. 
PREVIEW 347, 350 (2010). 
148 Two commentators express a spirited counter argument: “In Christian Legal Society, the 
Supreme Court discounted the student organization's Freedom of Association argument while 
ignoring the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  Instead, the Court held that the government 
has the ability to restrict freedom of association as a condition of accessing limited public fora.  
Put another way, the Court decreed that if groups want to use governmental property or 
channels of communication, they must be willing to compromise their missions by including 
those who disagree with their messages.  In order to be a Registered Student Organization or 
use an auditorium in the wake of Christian Legal Society, Christians must accept non–
believers, the NAACP must accept white supremacists, the Democrats must accept 
Republicans, and the Red Sox Nation must accept Yankee fans.  Instead of having relatively 
easy access to limited public fora, groups must now make the difficult choice between 
compromising their membership standards and forgoing access to a limited public forum.” 
Thro & Russo, supra note 112, at 484. 
149 Scharffs, supra note 20, at 303. 
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the basis of religious preference in their hiring of personnel.  It 
could even have implications for entities that receive tax 
exemptions and discriminate in the selection of their employees or 
leaders (something every church and most religious groups do).150 
 
The majority opinion was able to limit the confines of the decision to 
college and university public forums by the deft manner in which it 
concluded that limited public forum analysis “adequately respects and fairly 
balances” the Christian Legal Society’s religious speech and expressive-
association rights.”151  No precedent was cited in direct support of this 
conclusion, which now stands as precedent, and the arguments asserted in 
support of it, summarized in part VI above,152 are weak.  Presumably 
limitations on rights of association in college and university public forums in 
the future need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral to survive First 
Amendment challenges. 
The majority opinion in Christian Legal Society is also significant, 
because it granted deference to the judgment of academic administrators: 
“determinations of what constitutes sound educational policy or what goals a 
student-organization forum ought to serve fall within the discretion of school 
administrators and educators.”153  Granting deference to Hastings educational 
discretion likely pleased the Association of American Law Schools, which 
submitted a brief “emphasizing the importance of institutional autonomy and 
urging that law schools should have wide latitude in determining how to 
develop strong and effective programs,” and asking the court not to 
constitutionalize a policy issue involving “sensitive educational 
judgment.”154  Granting deference likely did not please “religious groups and 
other expressive association [which] have submitted amicus briefs on behalf 
of CLS [The Christian Legal Society], arguing that a holding in favor of 
Hastings would have significant negative implications for their rights of 
association and free speech.”155 
Finally, the case is significant because of the paucity of attention paid to 
the free exercise doctrine.  The Christian Legal Society devoted “only about 
one page of [its] brief to arguing that Hastings’ policy violated [its] free 
                                                 
150 Id. 
151 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 109 S. Ct. 2971, 2986 (2010). 
152 Supra notes 108-112. 
153 Christian Legal Society, 109 S. Ct. at 2989. 
154 Scharffs, supra note 2, at 303. 
155 Id. 
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exercise of rights,”156 and the U.S. Supreme Court devoted one short footnote 




In Christian Legal Society, the U.S. Supreme Court wrestles with three 
fundamentally important First Amendment issues: government restrictions on 
access to limited public forums, government restrictions on freedom of 
association, and government restrictions on student organization expression 
based on the content of that expression.  The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately 
uses limited public forum analysis to uphold Hastings’ imposition of the all-
comers policy on its student organizations.  The implication of that decision 
is that limitations on rights of association in college and university public 
forums in the future need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral to survive 
First Amendment challenges.  In reaching its decision, the majority opinion 
sidesteps the more difficult issue of whether or not religious and expressive 
association groups have the right to discriminate in the selection of their 
voting members and officers by concluding that public forum analysis 
adequately protects religious speech and expressive-association rights. 
By arguing vehemently that Hastings failed to apply its all-comers 
policy consistently and thereby improperly infringed on the Christian Legal 
Society’s religious expression and freedom of association, the dissenting 
opinion seeks to evaluate Hastings’ actions under the strict scrutiny test 
applied in association infringement cases.  Had the dissenters been successful 
in doing so, the decision would likely have gone the other way, opening the 
door to permitting religious and expressive association groups to discriminate 
in selecting voting members and officers. 
The manner in which these three competing interests are resolved in 
Christian Legal Society strikes the authors as being rather like the ancient 
game of “Rock – Paper – Scissors.” in which participants use hand gestures 
symbolizing the rock, paper, and scissors to defeat an opponent.  Gestures are 
resolved by the following rules: rock breaks scissors; paper covers rock, 
scissors cuts paper.  In Christian Legal Society, First Amendment principles 
are like the competing hand gestures.  Healy, Widmar and Rosenberger, 
                                                 
156 Id. at 304. 
157 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2995 n.27 (2010) (“CLS briefly argues 
that Hastings' all-comers condition violates the Free Exercise Clause.  . . .  Our decision in 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876, forecloses that argument.  In Smith, 
the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid 
regulations of general application that incidentally burden religious conduct.  Id., at 878-882, 
110 S.Ct. 159.  In seeking an exemption from Hastings' across-the-board all-comers policy, 
CLS, we repeat, seeks preferential, not equal, treatment; it therefore cannot moor its request 
for accommodation to the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
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which impose significant restrictions on the ability of academic organizations 
to restrict student organization speech and which mandate such limitations 
must be viewpoint neutral, are the rock. Dale and Hurley, which provide 
significant prohibitions against infringements on the freedom to associate and 
overturn the admission of members to clubs and organizations that have 
strong associational bonds unless there are compelling reasons and narrowly 
tailored means, signify the paper and therefore defeat the rock. Finally, in the 
majority view, limited public forum requirements, which accept restrictions 
on access to public forums if they are reasonable and viewpoint neutral, are 
the scissors, and scissors triumphs over paper. 
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